Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to model the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic version of Ellsberg's 3-color experiment. We nd that more subjects act in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Ellsberg (1961) it is known that a majority of people is reluctant to bet on events with unknown probabilities. However, despite the overwhelming empirical evidence on this behavior, called ambiguity aversion (see the survey by Camerer and Weber (1992) ), only a small number of studies investigate experimentally how ambiguity averse subjects behave in dynamic choice situations.
To ll that gap and inform further theoretical research, we run a dynamic version of the classical 3-color Ellsberg experiment which allows us to dierentiate between the competing assumptions used in the literature, consequentialism and dynamic consistency.
In the last two decades several theories of non expected utility have been suggested to model ambiguity aversion, for instance the Choquet expected utility of Schmeidler (1989) and the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
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To make these models tractable for economic and game theoretic applications, they were extended to include dynamic choice problems. In dynamic choice situations, decision makers receive information at consecutive points in time and formulate a contingent plan of action for the remaining time periods by updating their preferences. A central question that arises in this context is how updated preferences, which govern future choices, are related to choices made ex ante. Two properties underpin theories of updated preferences: dynamic consistency, and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes that are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We show that the dynamic Ellsberg urn oers a straight forward tool to investigate whether subjects facing ambiguity behave consistent with dynamic consistency or consequentialism.
1 Recently, various generalizations of Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility have been proposed: for instance invariant biseparable preferences by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) , variational preferences by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) , smooth ambiguity preferences by Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) , and vector expected utility preferences by Siniscalchi (2009b) . 1 It is well known (see Ghirardato (2002) ) that dynamic consistency and consequentialism imply that preferences are of expected utility form and beliefs are updated according to the Bayes rule. This result implies that by going beyond expected utility models, one of these rationality arguments must be relaxed. All decision makers displaying preferences for bets with known probabilities must violate either dynamic consistency or consequentialism, or both.
The existing theoretical literature on dynamic extensions of ambiguity models
has not yet reached consensus which of these rationality concepts is more plausible. Sarin and Wakker (1998) , Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005) show that it is possible to maintain both rationality arguments, however at the cost of imposing restrictions on the domains of acts and conditioning events over which preferences are dened. Other theories focus on one property. For instance Hanany and Klibano (2007) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) assume dynamic consistency and drop consequentialism, whereas Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) , Pires (2002) , Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) and Siniscalchi (2009a) drop dynamic consistency and retain consequentialism. As our main result we observe that a signicant majority of ambiguity averse subjects violate dynamic consistency rather then consequentialism. This evidence favors consequentialism as the more plausible rationality argument in the presence of ambiguity.
The dynamic 3-color experiment can also be seen as a tool to make the observations of the static Ellsberg experiment more robust. A not negligible fraction of subjects, classied as ambiguity neutral in the static Ellsberg experiment, violate either consequentialism or dynamic consistency after arrival of new information.
These subjects would be identied as behaving compatible with subjective expected utility theory in the static versions of Ellsberg's experiment, but are in fact non
Bayesian.
We ask subjects about their condence in their choices by marking a number on a scale from 0 (nil) to 5 (very strong). This allows us to identify indierent subjects, without distorting incentives. We also nd that subjects who violate dynamic consistency or consequentialism are less condent in their choices after receiving new 2 information.
There are two other papers, that we are aware of, that experimentally implement a dynamic extension of the Ellsberg urn. Cohen, Gilboa, Jaray, and Schmeidler (2000) test the Full Bayesian versus the Maximum Likelihood updating rule using a design very similar to ours. However, dierent to our paper, they assume that subjects always maintain consequentialism. Maher and Kashima (1997) run a series of six dierently framed Ellsberg urns to test behavior of subjects who show ambiguity aversion. They use questions similar to this study, but do not test for dynamic consistency or consequentialism (they assume separability, which is close to consequentialism, throughout most of the paper). They also use some strong implicit assumptions, e.g. Bayesian updating for ambiguity averse subjects and a very strong form of ambiguity aversion, when conducting their analysis. Both studies do not incentivise decisions through payment to subjects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the static Ellsberg 3-color experiment. In Section 3 the notion of consequentialism and dynamic consistency is dened and the dynamic version of 3-color experiment is presented. Section 4 describes the experimental design. In Section 5 the empirical results are presented and discussed. Finally we conclude in Section 6.
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Ellsberg's 3-color experiment
The most prominent theory of decision making under uncertainty is the subjective expected utility theory developed by Savage (1954 betting behavior, which can not be explained by subjective expected utility. To conrm this conjecture he suggested an experiment similar to the following one.
Consider an urn containing 30 balls, 10 of which are known to be yellow (Y) and 20 of which are somehow divided between blue (B) and green (G), with no further information on the distribution. One ball will be drawn at random from the urn.
Subjects face two choice situations, I and II, in which they are asked to choose between bets paying o 4 or 0, depending on the color of the drawn ball. For instance, in the rst choice situation, I, a subject is asked to decide whether she prefers to bet on the yellow color or on the blue color. we assume that these subjects have a subjective probability distribution, then preferring f 1 to f 2 implies that they have a higher subjective probability for a yellow ball being drawn than for a blue ball being drawn. But the fact that they prefer f 4 to f 3 implies that they have a higher subjective probability for blue being drawn than for yellow being drawn. These two deductions are contradictory. Subjects displaying such preferences are called ambiguity averse since they are reluctant to bet on events with unknown probabilities. Conversely, in the last column, subjects exhibit ambiguity loving behavior, since they prefer f 2 to f 1 and f 3 to f 4 and therewith they favor to bet on events with unknown probabilities.
In order to accommodate dierent ambiguity attitudes, various generalizations of subjective expected utility theories have been proposed. The most prominent are the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989) , which allows the decision maker's beliefs to be represented by not necessarily additive measures, called capacities, and the maxmin expected utility with multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , where the decision maker's beliefs are represented by set of probabilities. However, since our investigations are conducted in a model free setup, we are not restricted to a particular class of non expected utility models.
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Conditional preferences
Moving to dynamic choice problems, a central question that arises is how preferences are updated to incorporate new information. Since updated preferences govern future choices, it is important to know how they are related to choices made ex ante.
We restrict our attention to non null events. An event N ⊂ Ω is Savage null if for any bet f, g ∈ F it holds that f N g ∼ g, otherwise it is non null. After being informed that an event E has occurred, the decision maker constructs conditional preferences over F, represented by E . Before arrival of any information, her preferences over bets are represented by as usual.
Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between ex ante preferences and preferences updated according to interim information. The rst property, called dynamic consistency directly links conditional and unconditional preferences. It requires that choices made ex ante are consistently implemented in the future.
(DC) Dynamic Consistency: For any non null event E and all bets f, g ∈ F,
Essentially, dynamic consistency excludes reversals. This denition is in the spirit of, e.g., Machina (1989) .
2 When the decision maker prefers f to g without any information regarding E, and f and g are the same outside of E, she should also prefer f to g after being informed that E occurred.
The second property, called consequentialism and introduced by Hammond (1988), concerns solely the conditional preference relation.
(C) Consequentialism: For any non null event E and all bets f,
It requires that preferences conditional on a non null event E are not aected by the outcomes outside the conditional event, Ω \ E. Intuitively, once the decision maker is informed that the event E occurred, only the uncertainty about all subevents of E matters for conditional preferences.
2 Our experimental design ts also to the weakest version of dynamic consistency, suggested by Hanany and Klibano (2007) .
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Now consider a simple dynamic version of Ellsberg's 3-color experiment. As a mind experiment it was described by Hanany and Klibano (2007) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2008) . In the dynamic version, there is an interim stage, where subjects are informed whether or not the drawn ball is green. Moreover, subjects are allowed to condition their choices on the revealed information.
Depending on their choices in the interim stage, one can conclude whether subjects behave consistently with either dynamic consistency or consequentialism. Table 3 depicts implications on dynamic consistency and consequentialism resulting from choices made ex ante and choices made on the interim stage. The columns refer to choices made in the static Ellsberg experiment. Correspondingly, rows refer to choices made after being informed that the drawn ball is not green.
Ambiguity Attitude
Averse N eutral Loving the closed bucket and one ball of each color. The bucket remained in the room for the whole experiment and after the drawings were nished, subjects had the opportunity to look at the balls inside the bucket. After receiving and reading the instructions detailing the complete experiment, all subjects were handed the decision sheet, on which they marked their bets.
To implement the choice problem described above, subjects were asked to make 4 decisions. The rst two decisions were equivalent to choices I and II in Table   1 . The third and forth decision where designed to test the conditional preferences as described in section three. Choice III was identical to choice I and choice IV identical to choice II, with one exception: At the end of each question, we added the sentence if you come to know that the drawn ball is not green.
3 Dubois and Prade (1994) distinguish between dynamic choice situations which they call focusing and those they call learning. In the terminology of Dubois and Prade, the situation we implement is focusing.
3 See the appendix for complete instructions.
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A particular problem in ambiguity related experiments is how to deal with indierence. One possible solution is to force subjects to make a choice, the drawback being that some data points will reect indierent subjects, such that inferences from the Ellsberg decisions could be wrong (e.g. what looks like a preference reversal is not inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory if the subject was indierent). On the other hand, including an explicit indierent option raises problems in incentivised experiments: How will the subjects marking indierent be paid?
Choosing any rule, such as the experimenter ips a coin turns the problem into a decision with three alternatives, the coin ip being one of them. Subjects who prefer the coin ip need not be identical with those who are indierent in the original two alternative decision. To solve this problem, we did not oer an indierent option.
However, additionally to each decision, subjects were asked to mark How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose? on a scale ranging from 0 (nil) to 5 (very strong).
4 We interpret subjects who marked zero as having no condence that their choices are better than the alternatives, that is, as being indierent. These subjects where paid according to their decisions, but discarded from the analysis.
When everyone had nished their decisions, subjects took part in a timed 10 minute statistics and cognitive ability test, with 9 questions in total (3 questions from Shane Frederick's cognitive ability test (Frederick (2005) ), the Wason selection task (Wason and Shapiro (1971) ) and 5 simple statistics questions). Each correct answer was paid with 1 Euro. Finally, subjects were asked to answer an unpaid questionnaire which included demographics.
The draws took place at the end of the experiment. A randomly selected subject blindly drew a ball for each question. The balls were returned to the bucket after being shown to all subjects, so that all drawings were with replacement. Regarding question three and four, the following was stated in the instructions and implemented if needed: If the rst drawn ball happens to be green, we will continue drawing balls 4 Our question is similar to the one used by Chen, Katuscak, and Ozdenorenc (2007) . Curley, Young, and Yates (1989) test three methods to measure ambiguity in an experiment and nd that a question about condence in the decision performs best. 9 till a non-green ball is drawn. After the drawings were done, each subject was paid according to his/her decisions (each winning bet paid 4 Euro) and answers and the experiment ended.
Results
Out of our 90 subjects, 6 marked a condence of nil for at least one of their choices.
We interpret these subjects as indierent and drop them from the following analysis since we are interested in strict preferences, leaving us with 84 data points.
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First, we look at the choices in the rst two questions, which replicate the static Ellsberg experiment. The last row in Table 4 shows the proportion of ambiguity averse, neutral and loving subjects. We conrm previous observations (see Camerer and Weber (1992) ) that a majority of people are ambiguity averse in this decision Result 1: More subjects than expected under random choice are consequentialist.
Among the non-neutral subjects, less than expected are dynamically consistent.
Regarding the way subjects update preferences, Dubois and Prade (1994) distinguish two dierent approaches, learning and focusing, which coincide in the additive case thank to the Bayes rule, but need not coincide outside of subjective expected utility.
They consider two dierent updating rules: Maximum Likelihood updating and Full
Bayesian updating.
7 Intuitively, in the case of learning, the decision maker learns something about the composition of the urn. In this case, Dubois and Prade (1994) argue for the use of the Maximum Likelihood rule. On the other hand, focusing is a situation in which no information is provided regarding the composition of the urn, as it is the case in our experiment. Dubois and Prade (1994) 13 analysis, it is also interesting to look at the dierent levels of condence for each question. Again, we start by looking at the rst two questions, the static Ellsberg case.
As Figure 1 shows, all subjects are less condent in their second answer compared to the rst one. This dierence is signicant at the 1% level for ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral subjects, but not signicant for ambiguity loving subjects in a Wilcoxon test. However, the amount of condence that subjects lose depends on their choices: ambiguity averse subjects lose more condence than ambiguity neutral ones.
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Result 3: Ambiguity averse subjects report a higher loss of condence in their second choice compared to ambiguity neutral ones. The two-sided p-value of a Mann-Whitney-U-Test on conf idence1 − conf idence2 comparing ambiguity averse with ambiguity neutral subjects is 0.032. No comparison with ambiguity loving subjects is signicant. In both cases, the insignicant results for ambiguity loving subjects might be due to their small number in our experiment.
14 Next, we turn to condence levels for all four answers. Figure 2 depicts the condence levels for subjects depending on their adherence to dynamic consistency and consequentialism. To evaluate the impact of going from a static to a dynamic Ellsberg urn, we look at the dierence in average condence in the rst two compared to the last two questions: conf idence loss = (conf idence1 + conf idence2) − (conf idence3 + conf idence4). The rst impression that subjects who adhere to the rationality arguments lose less condence in the dynamic case is conrmed. As Table 7 shows, they have a signicantly lower condence loss than those subjects who violate one or both properties. This result is also conrmed when we use a multi-
¬DC, ¬C 0.000 0.455 0.01 - Table 7 : Signicance levels from two-sided MW test on updating condence loss nominal logistic regression to control for demographics and subjects' score in our cognitive ability questions (see appendix). Our results for subjects' condence make sense if one assumes that subjects are more condent in their choice if they know of a way to rationally argue in favor of that choice. The probabilistic Bayesian theory is the most mathematically simple and arguably the only one which our subjects might consciously use in the experiment. We nd the highest levels of condence for choices two to four exactly for those subjects who behave probabilistic Bayesian.
Result 4: Subjects who adhere to both dynamic consistency and consequentialism loose less condence in the dynamic choice situation, compared to those who violate one or both of these properties.
6 Conclusion
People who display the Ellsberg paradox can not be dynamically consistent and consequentialist at the same time. We conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsberg's 3-color experiment and nd that, in our setup, signicantly more subjects behave in accordance with consequentialism rather than with dynamic consistency. As such, our results can be seen as support for theories which retain consequentialism.
We observe that being ambiguity neutral when facing the static Ellsberg urn does not necessarily imply that subjects always behave Bayesian. Several subjects who are classied as ambiguity neutral in the static choice situation can not be described by subjective expected utility theory in the dynamic extension.
Furthermore, we measure indierence in ambiguity experiments: While all subjects are more condent in their rst choice, ambiguity neutral subjects lose less condence in later choices than ambiguity averse ones and Bayesian subjects lose less condence compared to those who violate dynamic consistency and consequentialism.
We hope that the dynamic extension of the Ellsberg urn will provide new insights for the discussion about behavior under ambiguity and will be a rst step towards 
Instructions
Welcome to our Experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. The instruction is identical for all participants. During the entire experiment, we want to ask you to be quiet and not to talk with the other participants. Please turn your mobile phone off and keep it turned off till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.
Goal of the experiment
This experiment includes decisions under uncertainty. In the decision phase, there are no "right" or "wrong" decisions. Only your personal preferences count. Depending on your preferences, it could well be that the decision will be very easy for you. The alternatives are real and not only hypothetical. Every participant will be privately paid in cash. The decisions of the other participants have no influence on your payment.
Structure of the experiment
At the start of the experiment, we will answer questions regarding the instructions. Afterwards we start the decision phase. Decisions in this phase are real. They do have an impact on your payment. Please take your time in answering, the experiment only continues once all participant are done. At the end, the payments for the decision phase will be determined and all participants are paid.
Overall, the experiment will take approximately 60 minutes.
Bucket
The bucket contains 30 
Decision phase
At the end of the experiment, 4 independent draws (with replacement) will be taken from the bucket -one draw for each of the 4 questions, which you answer on the decision sheet. Your payment depends on your answers and on the result of the draws.
On the decision sheet, you have to choice 4 times between 2 alternatives. The alternatives are as follows:
- 
Questionnaire 1
The decision phase is followed by questionnaire 1. Here right and wrong answers exist! In total, you have 10 minutes to answer all questions.
For each correct answer, you will be paid 1€ at the end of the experiment.
Questionnaire 2
Questionnaire 2 collects some personal data. This information will only be used for the evaluation of this experiment. The answers in questionnaire 2 do have no influence on your payment.
Draws
In the end, there will be 4 draws, one for each question from the decision phase. After each draw, the table tennis ball will be put back into the bucket. The draws will be taken by a randomly chosen participant.
It it happens that the first drawn ball is green for question 3 or question 4, there will be additional draws till the drawn ball is not green.
Payment
For each draw, you receive a payment if and only if the color of the drawn table tennis ball matches the color of the answer you marked. Additionally, you receive 1€ for each correctly answered question in questionnaire 1.
Decision Sheet
ID: _______
-Alternative W: You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow or green ball is drawn.
-Alternative X: You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue or green ball is drawn.
-Alternative Y: You receive a payment of 4€, if a yellow ball is drawn.
-Alternative Z: You receive a payment of 4€, if a blue ball is drawn.
Question 1
What do you like more?:
W X How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose?
Nil Very strong
Question 2
Y Z How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose?
Question 3
What do you like more, if you come to know that the drawn ball is not green: W X How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose?
Null Very strong
Question 4
What do you like more, if you come to know that the drawn ball is not green:
Y Z
How strong is your liking for the alternative you choose?
Null Very strong 20 Questionnaire 1
ID: _______
Page 1: 5 minutes maximum
Please assume for all questions that dice are six-sided and fair. Answer
Question 1: What is the probability that the number in a throw of a die is smaller or equal 2?
Question 2: What is the probability that in two throws, the number is both times equal to 4?
Question 3: Look at a single throw. Assume that the result is an even number. What is the probability that the number is equal to 2?
Question 4: Assume that the number 3 was thrown 5 times in a row. What is the probability that the next throw will result in a 3?
Question 5: Assume 4 dice are thrown and the numbers added. What is the total number on average?
21
Questionnaire 1
Page 2: 5 minutes maximum Question 6: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Question 7: If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Question 8: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
Question 9: Assume you see 4 double sided cards in front of you. Each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other side. Which card or cards do you have to turn around to test whether the following assertion is true: "If there is a vowel (A,E,I,O,U) on one side, there is an even number on the other side."
E K 4 7
Card 11 
